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Abstract
A pitched battle is currently being waged for control of the American banking industry. For over a hundred
years, the federal and state governments have maintained a complex, but relatively stable truce in their contest
for power. At the beginning of our republic, state governments were the primary charterers and regulators of
banks. In the wake of the Civil War, the National Bank Act created parity between federal and state banks,
cementing the notion of a dual banking system that endured through the twentieth century. But in the past
five years, the federal government has increasingly used its powers under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution to grab new authority for federal banking regulators and for federally chartered depository
institutions. A series of controversial federal regulations have preempted the application of state consumer
protection laws directed at prevention of predatory lending by national banks and thrifts. The preempted state
laws address a recent rash of fraudulent, deceptive, and unconscionable lending that is having a corrosive
effect on minority communities, senior citizens, and the entire lower middle class. In a related move, federal
banking regulators have also recently preempted the application of state law to independent contractors of
national banks and thrifts.
This essay explains the potentially far reaching impact of federal preemption of state regulation of independent
contractors. If these determinations are upheld, thousands of businesses, including insurance agents, mortgage
brokers, and automobile dealers, will be placed beyond state oversight - provided that they have agency
relationships with a national bank or thrift. Moreover, this essay uses economic agency cost theory to explore
the potential for mischief posed by placing bank and thrift agents beyond the reach of state government. In
particular, this Article argues that bank and thrift agents, by their nature, have lower incentives to forego
predatory lending than the depository institutions themselves. Given the limited resources of federal banking
regulators and their primary focus on safety and soundness, the Article concludes that preemption of state
regulation of bank and thrift agents is currently inadvisable.
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INTRODUCTION 
A pitched battle is currently being waged for control of the 
American banking industry.  For over one hundred years, the federal 
government and many state governments have maintained a complex 
but relatively stable truce in their contest for power. At the beginning 
of our republic, state governments were the primary charterers and 
regulators of banks.  In the wake of the Civil War, the National Bank 
                                                          
  *    Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin College of Law.  
The author wishes to thank the following for helpful conversations, comments, 
encouragement, and suggestions:  Jeffrey Davis, Ann Graham, Kathleen Keest, Lyrissa 
Lidsky, Martin J. McMahon, Bill Page, Gregg Polsky, Tera Peterson, Elizabeth 
Renuart, and Art Wilmarth.  Errors are mine alone. 
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Act1 created parity between federal and state banks, cementing the 
notion of a “dual banking system” that endured through the 
twentieth century.  But in the past five years, the federal government 
has become esurient, using its powers under the Supremacy Clause2 
of the U.S. Constitution to cut a new and wider footprint of authority 
for federal banking regulators and for banks that rally to their 
banner.  A series of controversial federal regulations have preempted 
the application of state consumer protection laws directed at the 
prevention of “predatory lending” by national banks and thrifts. 
These regulations are controversial, not merely because the recent 
rash of fraudulent, deceptive, and unconscionable lending has had a 
corrosive effect on minority communities, senior citizens, and the 
entire lower middle class.  Rather, their controversy lies in the fact 
that democratically-elected state representatives all across the country 
responded to their constituents’ demands by adopting such 
legislation, and no federal statute had ever explicitly authorized the 
unelected beltway banking custodians to dismiss these state consumer 
protection laws.3  In fairness, federal regulators have levied persuasive 
                                                          
 1. 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1864). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 3. In the case of home mortgage loans, approximately forty states, counties, and 
municipalities have adopted predatory lending laws attempting to protect 
homeowners from predatory mortgage brokers and lenders. State laws include:  
Arkansas Home Loan Protection Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-53-101 (2006); CAL. FIN. 
CODE §§ 4970-4979.7 (West 2003); Consumer Equity Protection Act, COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 5-3.5-201 (West 2006); Connecticut Abusive Home Loan Lending 
Practices Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-746-747, 754 (2006); Home Loan Protection 
Act, D.C. CODE § 26.1151.01 (2006); Fair Lending Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079-
.00797 (West 2006); Georgia Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1 (2006) (as 
amended); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-3103 (2006); High Risk Home Loan Act 137 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. § 1-137/175 (2006); Indiana Home Loan Practices Act, IND. CODE § 24-9-
4-1 (2006); Consumer Credit Code, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-1-101 (2006); High Cost 
Home Loan Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.100 (West 2006); Truth in Lending, ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-101 (2006); Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan 
Practices Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, § 1 (2006); Consumer Mortgage Protection 
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.1631-1645 (2006); Nevada Assembly Bill No. 284, NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 598D.010 (2006); New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-22 (West 2006); Home Loan Protection Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 
58-21A-1 (West 2006); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-L (Consol. 2006); Restrictions and 
Limitations on High Cost Home Loans, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2006); Consumer 
Protection Predatory Lending Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.25-1349.39 (West 
2006); Consumer Credit Code, OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 1-101 (2005); Mortgage 
Bankers and Brokers and Consumer Equity Protection Act, 63 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 
456.501-456.524 (2006); South Carolina High Cost and Consumer Home Loans Act, 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-23-10 (2005); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 343.001 (Vernon 2001); 
West Virginia Residential Mortgage Lender, Broker, and Servicer Act, W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 31-17-1 (West 2006); WIS. STAT. §§ 428.101-428.211 (2004). Local ordinances 
include:  CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, PREDATORY LENDING ORDINANCE §§ 
2-32-4545, 2-92-325, 4-4-155, 8-4-325 So2000-2145 of 2000 (2000); PROTECTION FROM 
PREDATORY LENDING AND MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2002, D.C. 
Law 14-132; D.C. CODE § 26-1151.01 (2001); PHILADELPHIA, PA., PROHIBITION AGAINST 
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arguments justifying their decisions as necessary in an increasingly 
national financial services marketplace.  In their view, as technology 
shrinks our world, the notion of fifty different banking jurisdictions is 
quaint, inefficient, and perhaps even silly.  Would it not save everyone 
a lot of time and trouble if we had only one set of laws to govern the 
banking industry? 
In a recent article, I observed that the political economy driving 
federal preemption of state banking regulation has a tendency to 
magnify the effect of preemptive action.4  Because federal banks, state 
banks, thrifts, credit unions, and non-depository lenders all act in the 
same zero-sum competitive environment, political shelter for one 
type of institution is a direct threat to every other type of institution.5  
When the regulatory patrons of one type of institution act to relax 
the regulatory constraints of their members, rival patrons must 
respond or risk losing their regulatory turf as the institutions they 
represent lose market share or shift their assets into better protected 
(read:  less regulated) charters.  This dynamic guarantees that even 
narrow federal efforts to preempt state law will merely creep.6  In the 
nearly thirty years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Marquette 
National Bank v. First of Omaha Corporation,7 preemptive actions have 
almost without exception crept out to cover more and more 
commercial activity.8  The result has been a steady, silent, 
deregulatory trend. 
One of the most recent manifestations of this preemption creep 
has been federal banking regulators’ efforts to extend immunity from 
state law to the agents of federal depository institutions.  These efforts 
                                                          
PREDATORY LENDING, PHILADELPHIA CODE §§ 9-2400 to 9-2408 (Apr. 9, 2001); DAYTON, 
OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 112.40-.44 (July 11, 2001); ATLANTA, GA.,ORDINANCE 01-
O-0843 (June 6, 2001) (codified at ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 58-100 
to -102 (Sept. 2001); OAKLAND, CA., ORDINANCE 12361 § 2 C.M.S. (Oct. 2, 2001); 
CLEVELAND, OH., ORDINANCE 737-02 (Mar. 4, 2002), amended at Ordinance 45-03 (Jan. 
14, 2003); TOLEDO, OH., ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING ORDINANCE, 291-02 (Nov. 5, 2002) 
(repealed); L.A., CAL., CAL. FIN. CODE DIVISION § 1.6 (Dec. 18, 2002). 
 4. Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending:  Unmasking the 
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 72 (2005) [hereinafter Federalism and Predatory 
Lending]. 
 5. Id. at 74. 
 6. Id. at 72-73. 
 7. 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (holding that, under the National Bank Act, a Nebraska 
bank was permitted to charge out-of-state customers a higher interest rate than their 
home state would have allowed). 
 8. My metaphor is by no means the only one.  Others have described this 
process, or at least parts of it, as the perpetuation of a grand illusion, James J. White, 
The Usury Trompe l’Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 445 (2000), and as an “amazing ever-
expanding” rubber band, Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding 
Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 
(2004). 
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have generated somewhat less commentary than one might expect.  
Once federal regulators attempted to preempt most state law and 
oversight for operating subsidiaries, preemption for agents of 
depository institutions seemed less surprising.  In what little has been 
written on this subject, most scholars have analyzed the legality of the 
regulatory action.9  Still, the preemption creep also produces the 
following questions:  did Congress authorize the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (the “OTS”) and/or the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (the “OCC”) to preempt state law with respect to bank 
agents?; may the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the 
“FDIC”) preempt state regulation of some state banking activities, 
including a state’s regulation of an out-of-state bank’s state licensed 
agent?; and, would five Justices on the recently reconstituted 
Supreme Court agree that a federal banking regulator can preempt 
state regulation of state licensed agents of a state chartered bank?  
While these are certainly questions that merit attention, this Article 
focuses instead on the advisability of federal preemption of state 
regulation of agents of depository institutions as a policy matter.10  In 
particular, this Article explores whether economic theory on the 
relationship between a principle and an agent may hold some useful 
insights for those pondering the ideal scope of federal preemption of 
state regulation of depository institutions.  Economists and legal 
scholars have long explored the costs and benefits of agency in a 
variety of different contexts.11  For example, a significant body of 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National 
Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981 
(2006); Mark A. Olthoff, National Bank Act Preemption in the Secondary Market, 123 
BANKING L.J. 401 (2006); Federalism and Predatory Lending, supra note 4, at 82. 
    10.    This focus on economic policy is also justified by the currently unsettled law 
regarding federal preemption of state regulation of operating subsidiaries of 
national banks. As this Article goes to press, the Supreme Court is currently 
deliberating this issue in Wachovia Bank v. Watters.  431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2900 (U.S. June 19, 2006) (No. 05-1342).  Because the law 
governing preemption of state regulation of operating subsidiaries and independent 
agents is comparable, a legal analysis of the latter is not likely to be productive while 
resolution of the former is pending. Yet a policy analysis of the economic incentives 
behind preemption for independent bank agents may be especially important now. 
If the Supreme Court endorses the Office of the Comptroller’s (“OCC”) attempt to 
preempt state regulation for operating subsidiaries, the analysis in this Article will be 
useful in ensuing litigation over preemption for bank agents. On the other hand, if 
the Supreme Court strikes down the OCC’s operating subsidiary rules, the analysis in 
this Article will be useful in legislative debates that surely will follow. 
 11. For influential introductions to the application of agency cost theory to law, 
see generally Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); 
Kathleen M.  Eisenhardt, Agency Theory:  An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 57 (1989); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-
Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); JEAN-JAQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, 
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research has developed using agency cost modeling to shed light on 
corporate law and the nature of the firm.12  In particular, agency cost 
theory has been applied to issues such as regulation of middle 
management,13 insider trading,14 and executive compensation.15  Legal 
scholars have also found interesting applications for agency cost 
theory in jurisprudence,16 criminal sentencing,17 antitrust,18 
securities,19 trusts and estates,20 and tax law.21  These theoretical 
                                                          
THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES:  THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (2002); Eric Posner, Agency 
Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric 
A. Posner ed., 2000); and Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency:  The 
Principals Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973). 
 12. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 
(1976) (landmark paper discussing the “nexus of contracts” theory of the firm and 
highlighting the importance of agency relationships in analyzing it). 
 13. See Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. 
REV. 727, 728-29 (2004) (suggesting that business and the law can be better analyzed 
by incorporating the theory of the firm into a traditional law and economics 
discussion). 
 14. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857, 861, 866-72 (1982-83) (proposing that “the insider trading debate 
is really a debate about whether the firm, as a matter of contract, should be able to 
allocate property rights in valuable information to managers or to investors”). 
     15. See Lucian Arye Bebchuck et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002) (rejecting the 
“optimal contracting approach” to executive compensation in favor of an 
examination of managerial power); William J. Carney, Controlling Management 
Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control:  An Agency Cost Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
385, 390 (1988) (arguing in favor of judicial action against opportunistic corporate 
management where compensation arrangements are unlikely to provide sufficiently 
strong incentives to align manager and shareholder interests); Kevin J. Murphy, 
Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2485 (Orley 
Ashenfelter & David Cards eds., 1999) (exploring executive compensation through 
empirical data on executive compensation and turnover); Tod Perry & Mark Zenner, 
CEO Compensation in the 1990s:  Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 126 (2000) (suggesting some CEO’s reduce the aligning 
effect of managerial incentive programs by selling company stock or using derivative 
contracts to minimize their exposure). 
 16. See Linz Audain, The Economics of Law-Related Labor V:  Judicial Careers, Judicial 
Selection, and an Agency Cost Model of the Judicial Function, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 115, 132 
(1992) (questioning “the nature of the mechanisms present in the judicial context to 
limit divergence of principal-agent interests and/or to limit agency costs”). 
 17. See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act:  
Recalling the Virtues of Delegating Complex Decisions, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 661 
(1992) (portraying judges as agents who are authorized to carry out the interests of 
the principal, Congress, in criminal sentencing). 
 18. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty:  An Economic Analysis of 
the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
715, 736 (2001) (using agency cost theory to analyze the criminal liability of 
corporations with employees that commit illegal acts). 
 19. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization:  A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1061, 1094-1100 (1996) (comparing agency costs of loan origination in 
traditional lending operations to origination intended for securitization). 
 20. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
621, 648-82 (2004) (applying agency cost theory to a variety of trust doctrines). 
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questions are considered in the context of the ongoing predatory 
lending controversy, which continues to rage in the nation’s press, 
courts, and legislatures. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief introductory sketch of the 
predatory lending problem and recent legal developments 
concerning federal preemption of state authority to address that 
problem.  Part II delivers an exposition of agency cost theory.  Part III 
applies those theories to the financial institution context.  It explores 
whether agents of depository institutions will have the same 
incentives to avoid predatory behavior as depository institutions 
themselves and also queries whether federal regulators are prepared 
to deal with any such disparities in those incentives without the 
assistance of state law enforcement.  Part IV offers brief concluding 
remarks. 
I. BACKGROUND:  THE INTERSECTION OF TWO CONTROVERSIES 
A.  Predatory Lending In an Era of Financial Deregulation 
Policymakers in all civilizations must face difficult choices about 
the extent to which public institutions will intervene in credit markets 
on behalf of debtors.  Throughout most of the twentieth century, 
American consumer credit law was generally rather skeptical of 
creditors who deployed harsh terms and practices in the origination 
and collection of consumer debts.22  For example, most states had 
usury laws that provided some upper limit on the pricing of small 
loans.23  And, federal bankruptcy protections chastised overreaching 
creditors by giving consumers the possibility of a fresh start.24  
Moreover, particularly beginning in the mid-1960s, a series of 
consumer protection initiatives at both the federal and state level 
were enacted, facilitating a historically unprecedented public 
                                                          
 21. See Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity Tax and Corporate Integration:  An Agency Cost 
Analysis and a Call for a Deferred Distributions Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7 (1993) 
(asserting that because managers have the power to control distributions, while 
outside investors do not, “Congress should be sensitive to ways to reduce the agency 
costs resulting from the imposition of the tax”). 
 22. See CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS:  TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE 
HIGH COST CREDIT MARKET 76-111 (2004) [hereinafter TAMING THE SHARKS] (tracing 
American consumer credit law as it reacted to cultural and historical changes); 
Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High Cost Consumer Credit:  The 
Historical Context of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807 (2003) [hereinafter 
Historical Context of Truth-in-Lending] (tracing the evolution of consumer credit laws 
leading up to the Truth-in-Lending Act, which calls for increased disclosure to the 
consumer). 
 23. BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 15-16 (1965). 
 24. Historical Context of Truth-in-Lending, supra note 22, at 866. 
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confidence in and acceptance of consumer borrowing.25  However, 
during the 1980s and largely continuing today, the trend against 
public intervention in credit markets took force. 
A large number of commentators have complained that neglect 
and relaxation of consumer protection statutes has emboldened a 
portion of the personal finance industry to engage in a variety of 
abusive, misleading, and unfair practices loosely grouped under the 
term “predatory lending.”  In general, even the staunchest critics of 
consumer protection statutes have conceded that a predatory lending 
problem of some sort exists, although which loans and practices 
should qualify as such remains a matter of great debate.26 
Much of the predatory lending market has been served by non-
depository creditors.  Traditionally, pawnshops, payday lenders, “buy 
here-pay here” car dealerships, and rent-to-own financiers have had 
no relationship with depository institutions.  Accordingly, federal and 
state banking regulators have understandably seen much of the 
troubling developments in predatory “fringe” markets as a problem 
outside their jurisdiction, and better addressed by attorneys general, 
law enforcement, and private litigation.27  But in recent years, several 
trends have called this assumption into question. 
First, mainstream depository institutions have acquired some of the 
most notorious predatory lenders and currently operate those 
lenders as subsidiaries.  For instance, in 2000 Citigroup acquired 
Associates First Capital Corporation, a firm dogged by predatory 
                                                          
     25. DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 1:1 (2006) 
 26. While the purpose of this short Article is not to carefully define the 
parameters of which types of loans are predatory, there are widely accepted and 
historically grounded benchmarks upon which a discussion can proceed.  For 
example, in the small loan market, most states continue to retain small loan interest 
rate caps on their books—although a variety of exceptions have rendered the caps 
frequently unenforceable.  Also, the U.S. Code treats loans at above forty-five percent 
as a per se evidentiary factor of extortionate criminal loan sharking. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 892(b)(2) (2000).  Historically, many ancient governments have capped interest 
rates at between twenty and thirty-six percent.  TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note 22, at 
51-61. In the market for home mortgages, many states have passed laws which set 
forth a recipe of terms that can combine to create a predatory loan.  For a summary 
of state predatory mortgage lending statues see, e.g., Baher Azmy, Squaring the 
Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 363-66 (2005); Federalism and Predatory 
Lending, supra note 4, at 61-68.  To some extent, the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act was the progenitor of this approach.  In other credit markets such as 
those for home furnishings, cars, or credit cards, there is less consensus on which 
terms and practices merit the label predatory. 
 27. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, 
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS TO GUARD AGAINST PREDATORY AND ABUSIVE LENDING 
PRACTICES, ADVISORY LETTER NO. 2003-2, at 1-2 (Feb. 21, 2003) (“[T]he OCC does not 
have reason to believe that national banks or their operating subsidiaries (collectively 
referred to herein as “national banks”) generally are engaged in predatory lending 
practices . . . .”). 
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lending allegations for years.28  In 2001 the North Carolina Attorney 
General’s office forced Citigroup into a $20 million predatory 
lending settlement.29  In 2002 the Federal Trade Commission forced 
Citigroup into another predatory lending settlement, this time for 
$215 million.30  Although Citigroup promised to clean up its new 
subsidiary’s business practices, allegations of predation have 
continued to dog the division.31 Civil and consumer rights 
organizations still accuse Citifinancial of predatory lending.32  And, as 
recently as 2004, the Federal Reserve Board ordered Citigroup to pay 
a $70 million fine after a three year investigation turned up 
additional violations by Citifinancial of the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act,33 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,34 and other 
predatory lending laws.35 
                                                          
 28. See, e.g., Assocs. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super. 2001) (“Typically 
predatory lenders take advantage of borrowers due to their lack of sophistication in 
the lending market, due to their lack of perceived options for the loan based on 
discrimination or some other factor, or due to deceptive practices engaged in by the 
lender that mislead or fail to inform the borrower of the real terms and conditions of 
the loan. The record in this case indicates that this is consistent with what occurred 
in the Troup transaction.”); Michael Hudson, Signing Their Lives Away:  Ford Profits 
from Vulnerable Consumers, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY 42, 42-50 (Michael Hudson ed., 
1996) (detailing the legacy of abusive lending by Associates); Citigroup Launches 
$200B Loan Program, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 2003, at 11 (noting that the loan program 
at issue targeted those who traditionally would have difficulty qualifying for 
mortgages); Sara Hoffman Jurand, Household Citigroup Agree to Record Settlements in 
Predatory-Lending Cases, TRIAL, Dec. 2002, at 67 (discussing Citigroup’s acquisition of 
Associates First Capital Corp.). 
 29. Associates to Refund $20 Million to North Carolina Mortgagors, 11(5) CONS. 
BANKR. NEWS 7 (Oct. 18, 2001). 
 30. Erick Bergquist, FTC’s Look At Subprime Industry Not Finished Yet, AM. BANKER, 
May 25, 2004, at 1.  Citigroup’s litigation with the FTC proved particularly 
acrimonious with the FTC publicly accusing Citigroup of stonewalling discovery.  
Paul Beckett, FTC Files Motion Against Citigroup In Lending Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 
2002, at B9 (“[T]he FTC said Citigroup has ‘effectively stalled’ in producing 
evidence for the discovery, . . . [and] refused to provide any documents created prior 
to March 6, 1998, ‘even though the FTC intends to prove that the Associates’ 
substantial and widespread illegal lending practices date back to at least January 1, 
1994.’”). 
 31. John Gamboa & David Glover, Viewpoints:  To Get Citi to Change Ways, 
Regulators Need to Do More, AM. BANKER, Sept. 27, 2002, at 9. 
 32. See Berguist, supra note 30, at 1 (“[T]he largest settlement in . . . [the FTC’s] 
history [of $215 million] was hardly a slap on the wrist to Citigroup.  The company 
has assets of over $1 trillion, so the settlement represented a meaningless percentage 
of its assets–less than 0.1%.  In fact, the settlement is likely to have less of a deterrent 
effect than a twenty dollar parking fine for a bank official earning $100,000 a year.”). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000). 
 35. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., In the Matter of Citigroup, Inc., Order 
to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon 
Consent (May 27, 2004); Erick Berguist, Citi-Fed Pact on Subprime:  Opening Act? AM. 
BANKER, May 28, 2004, at 1; Timothy L. O’Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million 
in Loan Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C1. 
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Second, many commentators have pointed to increasingly onerous 
and deceptive pricing in mainstream banking products.36  As the lines 
between the fringe and prime markets have blurred, mainstream 
lenders have turned to terms and practices which are gradually 
approaching a point which reasonable independent observers might 
describe as predatory.  For example, there have been widespread 
complaints about credit card default interest rates of more than thirty 
percent.37  Moreover, many are skeptical of universal default terms 
where a late payment on some other obligation, such as the 
consumer’s rent or a medical bill, can trigger the default interest rate 
on a credit card that the consumer has always paid on time.38  
Consumer advocates complain of bait and switch advertising in which 
credit card issuers unilaterally change contract terms shortly after 
origination.39  Finally, the increasing use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses and waivers of the right to pursue remedies in a class action 
may deprive consumers of a realistic opportunity to create case law 
inhibiting these sharp practices.40  Collectively, these developments 
and others like them41 have made many mainstream banking 
products appear quite similar to financial agreements traditionally 
found on the fringe market. 
Third, for several years, fringe and predatory lenders have sought 
to obtain their own banking charters.  In recent months, at least two 
appear to have succeeded in doing so.  Consumer advocates’ fears 
seem well grounded now that the OTS has extended a thrift charter 
to H&R Block, the largest tax return preparer in the country.42  For 
years, consumer groups have been troubled by loan pricing and 
                                                          
 36. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1025-26 
(2002) (discussing the impact of credit card debts on children of bankrupt 
consumers). 
 37. Kathy Chu, Shouldering Mega Credit Card Fees?, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 2005, at 
3B; Kathleen Day & Caroline Mayer, Credit Card Penalties, Fees Bury Debtors; Senate Nears 
Action on Bankruptcy Curbs, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1. 
 38. Patrick McGeehan, Plastic Trap—Debt That Binds:  Soaring Interest is 
Compounding Credit Card Woes for Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at A1. 
 39. Carolyn Carter et al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation:  In Need of Repair, 
10 N.C. BANKING INST. 23, 42 (2006). 
 40. Id. at 45-46. 
 41. Another troubling example is bounce protection plans on checking accounts 
that, in effect, charge interest rates comparable to payday loans to consumers who 
overdraw their checking accounts.  Owen B. Asplundh, Bounce Protection:  Payday 
Lending in Sheep’s Clothing, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 349, 350 (2004).  Consumer groups 
have complained that some banks charge bounce protection fees to consumers 
withdrawing money at ATM machines who do not realize they are overdrawing their 
account. Laura K. Thompson, Bank Overdraft Programs Rankle Consumer Groups, AM. 
BANKER, May 20, 2003 at 4. 
 42. Jody Shenn, H&R Block:  As OTS Oks Charter Bid, Spitzer Sues, AM. BANKER, 
Mar. 16, 2006, at 1. 
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inflated fees charged by H&R Block.43  They have accused H&R Block 
of deceptively marketing its loan products as quick tax returns, rather 
than as the low risk triple-digit interest rate loans they really are.44  
Similarly, the largest pawn shop chain in the State of Minnesota has 
successfully obtained an industrial loan charter.45  While industrial 
loan corporations are something of an unusual breed of bank in most 
of the country, in some states which authorize them, including 
especially Utah, the favorable charters have facilitated non-depository 
institutions in obtaining some of the same interest rate exporting 
capabilities as depository lenders.46  Moreover, with the likes of Wal-
Mart pushing for its own industrial loan corporation, fringe lenders 
with a history of predatory lending seeking the same thing may have 
an extremely powerful ally.47 
Finally, many banking institutions in the United States have not 
been shy about using agents to originate and service predatory loans.  
Many of the most powerful fringe credit businesses in the country 
have used the imprimatur of federal banking regulators in making 
loans with interest rates over ten times the federal forty-five percent 
per se evidentiary trigger for extortionate loan sharking.48  For years, 
                                                          
 43. See Damian Paletta, Tax Refund Loans Called Predatory, AM. BANKER, Feb. 1, 
2002, at 5 (referencing H&R Block’s policy of offering a loan against its customers’ 
tax refunds for a fee of twenty nine to eighty nine dollars); CHI CHI WU, JEAN ANN 
FOX & ELIZABETH RENUART, TAX PREPARERS PEDDLE HIGH PRICED TAX REFUND LOANS:  
MILLIONS SKIMMED FROM THE WORKING POOR AND THE U.S. TREASURY 12 (Consumer 
Federation of America & National Consumer Law Center, January 31, 2002) 
(calculating the profits earned by H&R Block as a result of its traditional and new 
electronic refund anticipation loan programs). 
 44. Much of the consumer group outrage over tax return loans stems from the 
fact that unlike many consumer loans, these products are low-risk, since the tax 
preparer is certain to receive a tax return check from the federal government.  
TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note 22, at 231-33. To the extent that there is repayment 
risk, it stems from the tax preparer’s own errors in preparing the consumer’s return 
documents.  Also, H&R Block has been criticized for skimming millions of dollars 
out of the government’s earned income tax credit, the most important remaining 
poverty entitlement program designed to lift children out of poverty.  WU, FOX, & 
RENUART, supra note 43, at 8-10. Apparently, these concerns did not deter the OTS 
from granting H&R Block a federal banking charter and the preemption rights that 
go along with it. 
 45. Sheryl Jean, Pawnbroker to Banker? The Leading Provider of Payday Loans to Cash-
Strapped Minnesotans Expands its Financial Services—But Consumer Advocates Aren’t 
Happy, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 2, 2006, at D1. 
 46. ILCs—A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Services, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings. 
asp?formmode=detail&hearing=487. 
 47. See generally Kevin K. Nolan, Wal-Mart’s Industrial Loan Company:  The Risk to 
Community Banks, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 187 (2006) (summarizing Wal-Mart’s efforts 
to enter the banking industry). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 892(b)(2) (2000) (defining extortionate extensions of credit as 
those that are “made at a rate of interest in excess of an annual rate of 45 per 
PETERSON.OFFTOPRINTE 1/30/2007  12:43:42 PM 
2007] PREEMPTION, AGENCY COST THEORY, & PREDATORY LENDING 525 
bank regulators facilitated predatory payday lending by allowing both 
state and federal banks to make predatory payday loans out of fringe 
lending company store fronts.49  It is true that the OCC and now 
more equivocally the FDIC have used their regulatory discretion to 
curtail payday lending by banks with the cooperation of fringe 
agents.50  Nevertheless, great damage was done to the fabric of 
American consumer protection law in the interim.  By allowing out-
of-state banks to make payday loans, local lenders could demand 
equal treatment from state legislators undermining usury laws one 
legislature at a time, all across the country.51 Meanwhile, at least for a 
time, fringe lenders with patron banks (with, in turn, a patron bank 
regulator) profited without concerning themselves with these ugly 
state political battles. 
As a result of the foregoing trends, the assumption that the 
predatory lending market has been served by non-depository 
creditors may no longer be legitimate.  In fact, the trends described 
above demonstrate that as depository institutions begin to participate 
in the fringe market and utilize practices that many consider to be 
predatory, the lines between predatory fringe lending and traditional 
lending have become blurred. 
B.  Preemption in an Era of Consolidating Federal Power:  The Case of Agents 
of Depository Institutions 
Collectively these trends, which all suggest that depository 
institutions may be growing closer to fringe market players and 
practices, have set a troubling stage for debates over federal 
preemption to play upon.  Non-profit consumer advocacy 
                                                          
centum . . . pursuant to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated interest 
and the balance is applied to the unpaid principal”). 
 49. See generally CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA & U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST 
RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING:  HOW BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS 
EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 2 (Nov. 2001) (providing a survey on state by 
state payday lenders and finding that both federal bank regulators and state attorneys 
general oppose the “rent-a-bank” trend). 
 50. Erick Bergquist, FDIC Payday Stance May Narrow Field Further Still, AM. BANKER, 
Mar. 17, 2005, at 1 (noting that new regulations could increase the cost of payday 
lending for depositories, cutting back the payday loan volume by almost twenty-five 
percent); Annys Shin, On Payday, Many GIs Pay Back; Military Members Face Long-Term 
Costs for Short-Term Borrowing, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2006, at F1 (discussing the 
Pentagon’s proposal to protect active military personnel by placing a cap on the 
annual rate payday lenders can charge). 
 51. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the 
Military:  The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 
653, 659 (2005) (concluding that the only way to prevent payday lenders from 
targeting members of the armed forces is by pursuing criminal prosecution of state 
usury laws). 
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organizations have been highly critical of federal preemption, as have 
state attorneys general.  Consistent with these concerns, many 
commentators have worried that federal preemption of various 
aspects of the consumer finance system will undermine momentum 
needed for reform of consumer protection law.  For example, Arthur 
Wilmarth has argued that the OCC’s efforts to create field 
preemption are an illegal and cynical power grab that will come at 
the expense of consumers.52  Bahir Azmy recently argued that state 
level predatory mortgage lending reform is a positive example of the 
states as laboratories of democracy in action.53  Robert Eager and C.F. 
Muckenfuss have described how state predatory mortgage lending 
statutes created a vehicle for federal banking regulators to issue 
orders preempting those statutes which gave an adumbrative 
competitive advantage to federal institutions over their state 
chartered counterparts.54  Margot Saunders and Alys Cohen have 
gone as far as to suggest that federal regulation is better seen as a 
cause of predatory lending than a hedge against it.55  I have 
speculated that because federal regulators are aware of state parity 
laws and the incentive of states to protect their own institutions, 
perhaps efforts to preempt have more to do with a deregulatory 
agenda than an effort to change the balance of power in the dual 
banking system.56 
Many in the banking industry, banking regulators in particular, 
have responded with formidable arguments on the necessity of 
federal preemption.  For example, Julie Williams and Michael S. 
Bylsma from the OCC have argued that federal preemption is 
                                                          
 52. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority 
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 247-53 (2004). 
 53. Azmy, supra note 26, at 391. 
 54. Roger C. Eager & C.F. Muckenfuss, III., Federal Preemption and the Challenge to 
Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 27-31 (2004). 
 55. Margot Saunders & Alys Cohen, Federal Regulation of Consumer Credit:  The 
Cause or the Cure for Predatory Lending? (Harvard University Joint Center for Housing 
Studies Working Paper Series, March 2004) at 17 (concluding that federal laws 
provide an excuse for the reduction in critical protections afforded to consumers by 
states).  Federal regulation has been ineffective because it fails to provide any real 
incentive for creditors to stop making loans which hurt consumers.  Id. 
 56. Federalism and Predatory Lending, supra note 4, at 96-97. Indeed rules currently 
under consideration by the FDIC appear to support this notion. The FDIC is 
considering moving to restore balance in the dual banking system by simply 
loosening regulation on state banks to mirror the immunity of federally chartered 
institutions.  If this approach works its way into the law, the result of preemption will 
not be a competitive advantage for one group of financial institutions, but less 
consumer protection overall without the nuisance of passing embarrassing 
congressional legislation. 
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necessary in an increasingly national financial services marketplace.57  
They have also pointed out that federal banking regulators have 
replaced state law and enforcement with federal banking regulations 
that are sufficient to prevent consumer abuse.58  Moreover, federal 
regulators have expressed skepticism over whether federal banking 
institutions have actually been involved in predatory practices.59  
Credit rating companies, such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, 
have buttressed these arguments by refusing to rate securities, 
including loans, from jurisdictions that adopt aggressive anti-predator 
liability rules.60  Fringe lender trade associations have tried to polish 
their public image by hiring expensive public relations firms, some of 
which have a track record of aggressive, bare knuckle political 
advocacy.61 
A still emerging front in this national debate is whether banking 
regulators can and should preempt state law with respect to non-bank 
agents of banking institutions.  By way of background, in recent years 
depository institutions have increasingly turned to outside 
contractors to complete a variety of tasks associated with banking 
                                                          
 57. Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and Federal Banking 
Agency Responses to Predatory Lending, 59 BUS. LAW. 1193, 1193 (2003-2004) (“[T]oday’s 
credit and financial markets are as national in scope as our highway system. Just as 
the value of a uniform interstate highway system to support our nation’s commerce is 
well recognized, the value of a uniform national system for provision of financial 
services is coming to be so.”). 
 58. Id. at 1194-1200 (detailing the various new safeguards that the OCC 
implemented to address predatory lending). 
 59. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Economic Issues in Predatory 
Lending, Unpublished OCC Working Paper, July 30, 2003, at 4, available at http:// 
www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf. 
 60. Natalie Abrams, et al., Standard and Poor’s Implements Credit Enhancement 
Criteria and Revises Representation and Warranty Criteria for Including Anti-
Predatory Lending Law Loans in U.S. Rated Structured Finance Transactions (May 
13, 2004), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=sp/sp_ 
article/ArticleTemplate&c=sp_article&cid=1093998408709&b=10&r=2&l=EN; Erick 
Bergquist, Ga. Amended Predator Law After Preapproval by S&P, AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 
2003, at 1. 
 61. Compare Press Release, Steven Schlein & Jay Leveton, For Immediate Release:  
Less Than 4 Percent of Military Have Taken a Payday Advance Loan Says New Survey, Feb. 
3, 2004 (on file with author) (press release issued on behalf of payday lender trade 
association), with Glen Martin, Chemical Industry Told to Get Tough:  Lobbyist’s Memo 
Advises Hardball Tactics for Fighting Tighter California Regulations, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 21, 
2003, at A21 (“‘They’re known for creating deceptive, phony front groups,’ Walker 
said. ‘They go through people’s trash; they make a policy of hiring former FBI and 
CIA operatives. Their motto basically is that they’re not a PR firm-you hire them 
when you want to win a war.’ . . . Steven Schlein, a senior vice president with Nichols-
Dezenhall, defended the firm’s tactics. ‘We may be aggressive in the service of our 
clients, but we never break the law,’ he said.”); see also Eamon Javers, “The Pit Bull of 
Public Relations”:  Eric Dezenhall serves clients such as ExxonMiobil by Going After their Foes, 
BUS. WK., Apr. 17, 2006, at 84 (“Journalist Bill Moyers, who tangled with Dezenhall’s 
firm over a 2001 documentary about the chemicals industry, says:  ‘I consider them 
the Mafia of industry.’”). 
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activity.62  For example, depository institutions have hired 
independent companies to conduct a variety of routine banking 
functions such as data processing, accounting, maintaining computer 
network security, and human resource administration.63  But 
depository institutions have also increasingly outsourced many tasks 
involving interaction with their customers, such as operating 
telephone call centers and bill paying services.64  Some depository 
institutions have also hired independent contractors for loan 
brokering, loan servicing, real estate appraising, telemarketing, and 
direct mail solicitation on behalf of the depository institution.65 
Depository institutions hire independent contractors to act as 
agents on behalf of the institutions for a variety of reasons.  One 
advantage of using independent contractors is avoiding sunken costs 
from excess labor capacity when business is slow.  When business 
picks up, depository institutions can quickly and flexibly respond 
through independent contractors to whom the institution lacks a 
long-term commitment.  Independent contractors are also 
responsible for their own benefits and health care—an increasingly 
important component of employee compensation given recent 
skyrocketing health care costs. Independent contractors that 
specialize in a particular banking activity may also develop special 
expertise allowing them to complete tasks more quickly and 
efficiently.  Moreover, in an era of bank mergers and acquisitions, 
long-term commitments to employees can reduce the flexibility of the 
institutions as they posture for the most advantageous capital 
structure.66 
                                                          
 62. See generally Lavonne Kuykendall, Market Changes, New Focus May Have Led NPC 
to Block, AM. BANKER, June 2, 2004, at 7 (discussing independent contractors in 
payment system banking); Jody Shenn, A Strategy Fix for RBC Mortgage:  New 
Compensation Structure Meant to Put Focus on Margins, AM. BANKER, Apr. 1, 2004, at 1 
(considering new industry practices with respect to loan origination). 
 63. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, THIRD 
PARTY ARRANGEMENTS, THRIFT BULLETIN TB 82a (Sept. 1, 2004) (clarifying the role of 
“significant” contracts with third-party firms and modifying the notification 
requirements for companies that use outside service providers); Karen Gullo, 
Outsourcing Poses Dilemma for Strategists, AM. BANKER, June 27, 1990, at 1 (noting that 
outsourcing is generally a useful tactic for small to medium-size banks that cannot 
afford to keep up with cutting-edge banking and data processing technology); James 
H. McKenzie & Jeb Britton, III, Should You Heed the Siren Song of Third-Party Firms?, 
ABA BANKING J., Oct. 1996, at 99 (describing the role of third-party firms in providing 
employee benefits and related services). 
 64. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, THIRD PARTY 
ARRANGEMENTS, THRIFT BULLETIN TB 82a (Sept. 1, 2004). 
 65. Orla O’Sullivan, The Profitability Riddle:  We Know What it is Not, But Not What it 
is, ABA BANKING J., Feb. 1998, at 78. 
 66. See Lee Conrad, Loan Muscle Wears a Tie Now, Works Phones, Makes $$:  Market 
Shakeout Leaves 20 Agencies as Major Players, and with little Bank Competition, They’re 
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However, one potential drawback of independent contractors has 
been regulatory.  As federal regulators have carved out protection for 
their constituent institutions from state oversight and law, federal 
depository institutions have found a competitive advantage by 
avoiding the necessity of state licensing fees, state inspections, and 
also (more controversially) the application of many state consumer 
protection laws.  This has created an issue of whether state law and 
regulatory authority apply to independent contractors of federal 
depository institutions.  On one hand, an independent contractor is 
just that:  independent.  Agents of depository institutions are not 
themselves depository institutions.  On the other hand, banking 
regulators have been reluctant to force depositary institutions into 
less efficient capital structures for no good reason.  What difference 
should it make whether a bank or thrift conducts its marketing or 
customer service through employees or through agents?  Why should 
the latter be subject to state law and authority when the former is 
not?  Finding no source of concern from these questions, federal 
banking regulators have taken a series of steps which either explicitly 
or implicitly have allowed agents of depository institutions to attempt 
to avoid state legal and regulatory authority under the guise of 
federal preemption. 
To date, the OTS has made the most explicit effort to preempt 
state law and oversight with respect to non-depository agents of 
federal depository institutions.  In October 2004, the OTS general 
counsel’s office issued an opinion letter responding to an inquiry 
from a federal savings association and its wholly owned subsidiary.67  
The thrift in question wanted to know whether independent agents it 
had hired to perform marketing, solicitation, and customer service 
on loan products were “subject to state licensing or registration laws 
by reason of performing such activities on behalf of, and as agents 
for, the Association.”68  The thrift in question had entered into 
contracts with the independent businesses to market the thrift’s loans 
through direct mail, telephone, and personal contacts.  The 
independent contractors also assisted loan applicants in completing 
application forms, answering questions, forwarding completed 
                                                          
Going After a Mountain of Late Debts. First Order of Business, Set Up Shop in India, U.S. 
BANKER, May 13, 2004, at 46 (surveying new trends in debt collection, including 
“debt buying”). 
 67. OP. CHIEF COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, AUTHORITY OF A FEDERAL 
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION TO PERFORM BANKING ACTIVITIES THROUGH AGENTS WITHOUT 
REGARD TO STATE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS, P-2004-7 (Oct. 25, 2004), 2004 OTS 
LEXIS 6 [hereinafter OTS, P-2004-7]. 
 68. Id. at *2. 
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applications to the thrift, and other various customer service duties.69  
The independent contractors had exclusive representation 
arrangements where they did not provide similar services to any other 
lender.  They received compensation based on the number of 
transactions “actually consummated” by the thrift.70  The source of 
controversy behind the opinion letter was the fact that many states 
had required the independent contractors performing mortgage 
brokering services to register, obtain licenses, and otherwise comply 
with the state’s mortgage brokerage licensing statute.71 
In response to the inquiry, the OTS reasoned that thrifts were 
entitled to the freedom to make business decisions on how to 
conduct their operations.72  It explained that thrifts should not be 
subject to state law simply because they chose to use an independent 
contractor rather than one of their own employees.73  Still, the 
administrative action is at least partially explained by the massive 
financial interest at stake.  According to an influential insurance 
industry trade publication, over fifty insurance companies now own 
institutions with federal banking charters.74  The largest of these 
insurance companies is State Farm, which owns State Farm Bank, a 
thrift regulated by the OTS.75  Under the OTS opinion letter, State 
Farm’s approximately 17,000 insurance agents—all of whom are 
already subject to state insurance law—are purported to be free from 
state mortgage lending regulatory licensing and oversight in 
marketing home mortgages to their insurance clients.76  In addition 
to significantly decreasing State Farm’s regulatory oversight, the 
opinion also coincidentally increased the power base of the OTS.77 
For its part, the OCC issued a similar regulatory preemption 
determination in 2001.78  While the OCC’s provision is rather less 
                                                          
 69. Id. at *4. 
 70. Id. at *6. 
 71. Id. at *9. 
 72. Id. at *34. 
 73. Id. 
 74. State Farm Receives Federal Bank Charter, BEST’S INS. NEWS, Dec. 16, 2004. 
 75. State Farm Digging in Its Heels Over Regulatory Ruling, BEST’S INS. NEWS, Dec. 17, 
2004. 
 76. Id.; see  OTS, P-2004-7 supra note 67, at *14 (declaring that federal savings 
associations may operate as deposit and lending institutions without regard to state 
licensing and registration requirements). 
 77. See OTS, P-2004-7, supra note 67, at *15-16 (“[M]arketing and solicitation are 
subject to regulation by OTS.  A state may not put operational restraints on a federal 
savings association’s ability to offer an authorized product or service by restricting 
the association’s ability to market its products and services and reach potential 
customers.”). 
 78. See Preemption Determination, 66 Fed. Reg. 28593, 28595 (Dep’t of the 
Treasury May 23, 2001) [hereinafter OCC Car Dealership Preemption Letter] 
(deciding that federal law preempts the Michigan Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, 
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explicit in its reasoning, it makes up for this in sheer chutzpah.  The 
regulation purports to preempt the application of state consumer 
protection law and authority to used car dealerships (of all 
businesses) where they are acting as an agent of a national bank.79  
While there is no question that car dealerships provide an important, 
indispensable, and legitimate service to Americans, there is also no 
denying that automobile sales present one of the most notoriously 
treacherous personal finance situations faced by American 
consumers.80  The state statute in question, the Michigan Motor 
Vehicle Sales Finance Act of 1950,81 which dates back to the Truman 
administration, was designed to attempt to rein in some of the 
abusive car dealership practices faced by Michigan residents.  To this 
end, the statute required that “a person shall not engage in this state 
as a[n] . . . agent” in “the business of an installment seller of motor 
vehicles under installment sale contracts” without a license.82  Car 
dealers in Michigan are also required to put up a bond to cover 
liability to the state or consumers victimized by unlawful behavior,83 
and to make available their records to the state Financial Institutions 
Bureau.84  Moreover, the statute includes a variety of consumer 
protection provisions including price disclosures,85 the prohibition of 
some potentially abusive contractual terms,86 rules attempting to 
prevent unfair or coercive insurance sales in connection with car 
sales,87 and limits on the type of junk fees dealers can charge.88  
Finally, the statute also limits the interest rate on car loans where a 
car dealer itself is offering the loan or is acting as a broker or agent 
for the lender.89 
The OCC’s ruling resulted from a dispute about an agreement 
between National City Bank, a national bank located in Ohio, and a 
                                                          
because the Michigan law conflicts with “OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers over 
national banks”).  
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Michael Feyen, Showroom Turncoat Comes Clean:  Dirty Dealing Exposed, 
and How Not to Get Taken to the Cleaners When Buying a Car, CAR & DRIVER, May 2006, at 
94 (describing remorse felt by a former car salesman over past dealings with naïve 
customers). 
 81. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 492.103 (2005). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. § 492.105. 
 84. Id. § 492.110. 
 85. Id. § 492.113. 
 86. See id. § 492.114 (including provisions on acceleration clauses, clauses waiving 
legal rights, clauses granting the dealership the power of attorney, and clauses 
waiving of assignee liability for the dealer’s unlawful behavior). 
 87. Id. § 492.116. 
 88. Id. §§ 492.117, 492.131. 
 89. Id. § 492.118. 
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car dealership in Michigan.90  Under the agreement, the dealer was to 
serve as a limited agent on behalf of the bank in soliciting car loans, 
taking applications, preparing loan documentation, and closing the 
loans by obtaining the consumer’s signature on all the required 
documents.91  National City Bank agreed to compensate the car 
dealer by paying a commission on each loan closed.92  Under the 
contract, the bank had exclusive authority to approve loans, but the 
dealership was free to charge interest rates in excess of those 
required by the bank’s underwriting guidelines.93  When customers 
agreed to interest rates inflated beyond the bank’s risk-based 
underwriting standards, the bank offered a kick-back, sometimes 
called a yield spread premium, to the dealer in addition to the 
normal commission.94  In such arrangements, the car dealer or 
mortgage broker receives compensation in addition to a base 
commission in exchange for originating an “above par” loan—that is, 
a loan with a higher interest rate than the borrower qualifies for 
based on the lender’s own guidelines.95  Consumer advocates and 
scholars have criticized this type of yield spread premium as one of 
the most important indicia of predatory lending.96  Some empirical 
research suggests that minority and women borrowers end up paying 
higher interest rates where a lender and its agent sets up this type of 
relationship.97  Moreover, even when disclosed, this type of 
compensation is deceptive and confusing because borrowers rarely 
suspect that they will be charged an extra fee for the privilege of a 
                                                          
 90. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND INDUSTRY SERVICES- FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BUREAU, 
IN THE MATTER OF:  REQUEST BY RODNEY D. MARTIN (Jan. 1, 2000), http://www. 
michigan.gov/cis/0,1607,7-154-10555_20594_20597-51126--,00.html (declaratory 
ruling) [hereinafter Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau Ruling]; OCC Car 
Dealership Preemption Letter, supra note 78, at 28593-94. 
 91. OCC Car Dealership Preemption Letter, supra note 78, at 28593. 
 92. Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau Ruling, supra note 90. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note 22, at 142; Brian A. Wahl, Yield Spread Premium 
Class Actions Under RESPA:  Confusion Predominates, 19 REV. LITIG. 97, 98 n.1 (2000). 
 96. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices:  Abusive Use of Yield Spread Premiums:  S. 
Hearing 107-857 before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th 
Cong. 22-23 (2002) (statement of Ira Rheingold, Executive Director, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Consumer Advocates) (testifying on the exploitative nature of yield spread premiums 
that are used against unsuspecting consumers); Brian Collins, Consumer Groups Still 
Pushing Hard on RESPA, ORIGINATION NEWS, May 1, 2006, at 81 (reporting consumer 
groups’ arguments that the extra fees associated with yield spread premiums are 
hardest on the most naïve consumers). 
 97. See generally Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation:  
The Case of Yield Spread Premiums 3 (Jan. 8, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author).  
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higher interest rate.98  Yield spread premiums give the broker or 
dealer the flexibility to target unsophisticated or trusting borrowers 
with sometimes ruinous prices, while still not losing borrowers who 
are more responsive to price competition. 
Rather than simply complying with the statute—like other lenders 
and car dealers in Michigan—National City and its agent petitioned 
the Michigan State Financial Institutions Bureau for a declaratory 
ruling stating that the law did not apply to the bank, nor to the car 
dealership with whom it had contracted.99  Understandably, the 
Michigan agency refused to waive the application of the state motor 
vehicle installment sales law to the car dealership simply because the 
dealer signed a contract with an out-of-state bank.100  In its ruling, the 
Bureau did not contest that National City Bank was free to charge 
Ohio interest rates in direct loans to borrowers.  Rather, the Bureau 
reasoned that when a national bank originated loans through car 
dealerships—business entities chartered, licensed, and regulated by the 
State and seemingly well beyond the scope of the Riegle-Neal Act101—
those dealerships were nevertheless obliged to comply with the 
commands of the Michigan legislature.102  After all, the Supreme 
Court has not, at least not yet, announced a “most favored used car 
dealer” doctrine.103 
Nevertheless, when National City Bank later asked the OCC for an 
opinion that would circumvent the Michigan regulator’s decision, the 
OCC obliged.  In making its case, the OCC began with the truisms 
that national banks are authorized to make loans and to use agents in 
                                                          
 98. TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note 22, at 144 (describing yield spread premiums 
as particularly insidious “[s]ince the borrower never knows about the yield spread 
premium, the broker can still collect up-front cash compensation from the borrower 
in addition to the yield spread premium which is paid through the loan proceeds”). 
 99. Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau Ruling, supra note 90. 
 100. See id. (finding that Michigan laws apply to contracts between Michigan 
residents and out-of-state banks). 
 101. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (removing 
state erected barriers to nationwide banking operations). 
 102. Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau Ruling, supra note 90.  The Bureau 
explained: 
Where a bank licensed under the Act has engaged a licensed installment 
seller as an agent to facilitate the making of installment sale contracts, the 
agent must not only maintain licensure under the Act, but must endure that 
the installment sale transaction that it is facilitating is conducted in full 
compliance with the Act.  Where such agent has facilitated the making of an 
installment sale contract and that transaction does not comply with the Act, 
that agent may be subject to an administrative enforcement action as well as 
any applicable criminal sanction.   
Id. 
 103. Cf. Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873) (announcing the 
most favored lender doctrine in interpreting Section 85 of the National Bank Act). 
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connection with their business.104  Moreover, the OCC pointed out 
that under the Marquette Doctrine,105 national banks are free to charge 
interest rates in accordance with the laws of the bank’s home state.106  
From these three premises the opinion letter concludes that, “in our 
opinion, Federal law preempts the [Michigan Motor Vehicle Sales 
Finance Act] . . . because the statute, as interpreted, conflicts with 
Federal law authorizing the Bank to engage in the activities in 
question and with the OCC’s exclusive visitorial powers over national 
banks.”107 
Aside from being something of a grating non sequitur, the letter 
never points to any specific statutory language from Congress 
authorizing the OCC to prevent Michigan from imposing consumer 
protection law on its car dealerships.  Also noticeably absent from the 
OCC’s determination was any mention of the arguably predatory 
yield spread premium-based compensation National City Bank 
intended for its car dealer/agent. 
Given the potentially far-reaching annulment of cumbersome state 
consumer protection law and regulatory oversight, it should come as 
no surprise that state depository institutions have become envious of 
the immunity from state law enjoyed by federal lenders.  In 2005, the 
Financial Services Roundtable petitioned the FDIC to issue a rule 
granting sweeping preemption of state law to state chartered banks.108  
After a public hearing on the subject, the FDIC issued a notice of 
rulemaking proposing to adopt much of the policy suggested by the 
roundtable.109  However, at the time of this writing, the FDIC had not 
yet acted on the proposed rules.110  Like previous actions by the OTS 
                                                          
 104. See OCC Car Dealership Preemption Letter, supra note 78, at 28595 (“First, 
section 24 (Seventh) specifically authorizes national banks to make 
loans. . . . Second, the authority of national banks under section 24 (Seventh) 
permits a national bank to use the services of agents and other third parties in 
connection with a bank’s lending business.”). 
 105. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s creation of 
the most favored lender doctrine). 
 106. See OCC Car Dealership Preemption Letter, supra note 78, at 28595 (“Finally, 
under 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000), national banks may charge interest in accordance with 
the laws of the state where the bank’s main office is located without regard to where 
the borrower resides and despite contacts between the loan and another state.”). 
 107. Id. 
 108. The Roundtable petitioned the FDIC to adopt rules designed to provide 
parity between state banks and national banks, by regulating state banks and their 
subsidiaries.  See Interstate Banking and Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 
60019, 60019 (proposed Oct. 14, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 331 & 362).  
 109. Id. 
 110. The proposed FDIC rules have put state banking regulators in something of a 
quandary.  Ethan Zindler, State Agencies Divided On FDIC Preempt Plan, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 22, 2005, at 1.  On the one hand, they risk losing influence over financial 
institutions in their states if state banks shift into federal charters.  Id.  On the other 
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and OCC, the FDIC’s proposed rules will inevitably force the agency 
to take a position on preemption with respect to agents of state 
banks.  For now at least, the FDIC’s proposed rules do not specifically 
address whether preemption will also apply to independent 
contractors of state banks.  Rather the proposed rules make 
preemption for out-of-state, state banks coextensive with the 
preemption given to national banks.  The proposed rule states: 
[A]n out-of-State, State bank that has a branch in a host State may 
conduct any activity at such branch that is permissible under its 
home state law if it is either: 
(1) Permissible for a bank chartered by the host State, or 
(2) Permissible for a branch in the host State of an out-of-State, 
national bank.111 
Under the FDIC’s proposed rules, preemption for state banks is 
coextensive with preemption for national banks, as determined by 
the OCC.  Therefore, given the OCC’s ruling on agents, it seems that 
the proposed FDIC rules will preempt the application of state law to 
state licensed agents of an out-of-state, state bank. 
Even more puzzling, if the proposed FDIC rules are adopted, it 
seems that the consumer protection laws of a state bank’s own state 
will not apply to independent bank agents otherwise licensed by that 
state.  After all, virtually all states have wild card parity laws for their 
own state chartered banks.112  These rules purport to give every power 
to local banks that out-of-state banks have under federal law.  Thus, 
under the proposed FDIC rules, unless the courts refuse to play 
along, a synthesis of federal banking regulations and state law would 
appear to allow any depository institution to engage any independent 
contractor to make and service loans with immunity from state 
oversight and consumer protection laws.113  Who could have foreseen 
                                                          
hand, some regulators have opposed the rules for fear that they will weaken their 
regulatory authority by creating still more incentive for banks to relocate to states 
with weak regulation.  Id. 
 111. Interstate Banking and Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60019, 
60031 (proposed Oct. 14, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 362.19(d)). 
 112. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE COST OF CREDIT:  REGULATION AND 
LEGAL CHALLENGES § 3.11.1 (2d ed. 2000); Eager & Muckenfuss, supra note 54, at 66-
67; John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before Meeting of 
Women in Housing and Finance 7-8 (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://www.occ. 
treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-69a.pdf. 
 113. Presumably state laws that have only an incidental relationship to a bank’s or 
thrift’s authorized powers would not be preempted.  But, we might translate this into 
‘state laws are not preempted, unless they actually protect a consumer from 
something.’  This is small consolation indeed. 
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the bickering and mischief made inevitable when the Supreme Court 
first picked its “most favored” lender?114 
As of yet, the judicial branch has not yet taken a clear position on 
whether federal preemption extends to independent agents of 
depository institutions.  But eventually this issue should work its way 
into the courts.  When it does there will be occasion for careful 
reflection on the advisability of the regulators’ position.  Obviously 
the text of the Riegle-Neal Act and Congressional intentions with 
respect to the agents of depository institutions will play the central 
role in this litigation.  Nevertheless, courts (and banking regulators) 
must interpret Congressional statutes with a sanguine eye to the 
actual policy implications of their decisions.  In the next Part, I 
describe how agency cost theory may hold some insight in analyzing 
this question. 
II. AGENCY COST THEORY 
The complexity of agency relationships has created a fertile field 
for legal and economic analysis.115  A principal and an agent form an 
agency relationship because they each expect to receive some net 
benefit.  The parties expect that the relationship will lead to an 
efficient division of labor.  Thus, a principal might benefit from the 
greater expertise of an agent, such as where shareholders of a 
corporation hire managers to skillfully oversee their ownership 
interest in the firm.  Similarly, agency relationships allow investment 
in many different productive enterprises, which allows those with 
wealth to diversify their holdings, thereby insulating them from 
unforeseeable risks inherent in any one given venture.  Sometimes 
principals seek agents where the principal recognizes, ex ante, the 
                                                          
 114. In Tiffany, the Supreme Court asserted that national banks are “national 
favorites.”  85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873).  This label subsequently evolved into a “most 
favored lender” doctrine.  See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 
439 U.S. 299, 314 n.26 (1978) (observing that “most favored lender” status for 
national banks had been incorporated into regulations promulgated by the 
Comptroller of Currency). 
 115. Economists have generally used a far more inclusive definition of agency 
relationships than does the law.  For example, Stephen Ross defined agency 
relationships as arising “between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the 
agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the 
principal in a particular domain of decision problems.”  Ross, supra note 11, at 134.  
For economists, even contractual arrangements between an employer and employee 
are sometimes viewed through the lens of agency cost theory.  Id.  This Article does 
not intend to contribute to economic agency theory as such, nor does it hope to 
examine every conceivable agency relationship, as broadly construed, that might 
arise within the context of financial institutions.  Rather, it hopes to mine agency cost 
theory for useful insights on the question of extending federal preemption of state 
law for independent contractors of depository institutions. 
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potential for some non-welfare maximizing behavior, such as when a 
parent creates a spendthrift trust for a child.116  Even where a 
principal has greater capabilities with respect to a task than an agent, 
the principal may also have higher opportunity costs, and thus can 
capture a Pareto gain from the agent’s relatively inexpensive labor.117 
Despite these obvious advantages, agency relationships also come 
with significant costs.  One of the central insights of economic agency 
cost theory over the past generation is that while an agency 
relationship may be relatively efficient in comparison to no 
relationship at all, the incentives of a principal and her agent 
nevertheless are frequently (if not always) misaligned.118  Principals 
virtually never enjoy representation of an agent with the same cost-to-
benefit ratio for expending resources on the completion of a given 
productive task.  For example, in the classic corporate context, the 
manager of a company who has no wealth invested in the corporation 
she manages will have relatively little incentive to carefully manage 
corporate funds in comparison to the shareholders of that 
corporation.119  Similarly, because a real estate agent receives only a 
percentage of the purchase price of a home, he has less incentive to 
invest time driving up the marginal sale price than the actual seller 
the agent represented.120 
Social norms, business practices, contract terms, and the legal 
system often attempt to more closely align the incentives of agents 
and their principals.  When asked by a stranger at the beach to 
temporarily watch the stranger’s belongings, most people will invest 
some care and attention for those belongings even at a cost to 
themselves.  Likewise, shareholders expect CEOs and other corporate 
managers to carefully and transparently document the expenditure 
of corporate resources to facilitate oversight.  Similarly, a real estate 
                                                          
 116. See Sitkoff, supra note 20, at 674-77 (describing the governance and benefits 
of “spendthrift trusts”).  Spendthrift trusts have an advantage over ordinary trusts 
because they shield the assets within the trust from the beneficiaries’ creditors.  Id. 
 117. A Pareto gain (or a Pareto-efficient result) occurs when resources are 
allocated such that at least one individual is better off, without making any other 
individual worse off.  James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. 
JURIS. 1, 5 (2002). 
 118. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308.  But see Posner, supra note 11, at 
230 (observing that the tension between the principal’s and agent’s goals should not 
be exaggerated because they can be overcome if the agent is paid enough). 
 119. See Posner, supra note 11, at 233-34 (remarking that shareholders of a 
corporation have comparatively more incentive to monitor corporate funds and 
practices than does a corporate manager, who will often be paid with a combination 
of salary plus stock or stock options, thus having less invested in the corporation). 
 120. See id. at 228-29 (noting that despite the incentive that a percentage rate 
commission affords, expending effort might not be worth it to a real estate agent if 
there is only a limited chance that a house will sell). 
PETERSON.OFFTOPRINTE 1/30/2007  12:43:42 PM 
538 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:3 
broker contract, which provides a bonus for obtaining a large sale 
price, might mitigate some of the agent’s incentive to shirk his 
duties.121  And, the law holds a trustee liable to his beneficiaries for 
losses sustained from reckless or unauthorized investments.122  
Indeed, so entrenched is the notion of the need to keep the 
incentives of agents and principals aligned that the law frequently 
holds principals liable for the misdeeds of an agent.123 
For a person or business to decide whether or not to contract with 
an agent, she must weigh the expected benefits of that relationship 
against its potential costs.  Economic agency cost theory can assist in 
analyzing and quantifying those costs. Perhaps the most influential 
model of agency costs, first established by Jensen and Meckling, 
defines “agency costs as the sum of three variables:  (1) the 
monitoring expenditures of the principle, (2) the bonding 
expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual loss.”124 
The first type of agency cost is expenditures by the principal in 
monitoring the agent.  By monitoring costs, economists usually imply 
not only observing the behavior of the agent, but also “efforts on the 
part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through 
budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.”125  
Sometimes commentators divide this class of agency cost into 
external and internal monitoring.126  With respect to the former, 
investors in a firm might hire accountants to periodically audit the 
books of a venture to deter inefficient allocation of resources by 
managers.  Or with respect to the latter, a homeowner might 
purchase a newspaper and read the classified listings to discover 
whether her realtor is advertising the home as promised. 
The second class of agency costs are usually labeled “bonding 
expenditures.”  By this, economists refer to situations where the 
principal will pay the agent to expend resources to guarantee that the 
agent will not take actions that harm the principal.127  A bonding cost 
is incurred where the principal pays a premium to the agent to create 
some pool of resources or a legal obligation from which the principal 
                                                          
 121. See id. at 226-29 (exploring the agency incentives of contracts where 
compensation increases with performance). 
 122. See Sitkoff, supra note 20, at 641-42, 655-57 (discussing the duty of care that a 
trustee owes to the beneficiaries of the trust). 
 123. Thus, the doctrine of respondeat superior.  See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499-501 (5th ed. 1984) 
(discussing the theory and evolution of vicarious liability in tort law). 
 124. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308. 
 125. Id. at 308 n.9. 
 126. E.g., Meurer, supra note 13, at 735-36. 
 127. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308. 
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can be compensated for detrimental actions of the agent.  Thus, for 
example, where a legal client hires an attorney for representation, a 
portion of the client’s legal fees is diverted by the attorney into 
malpractice insurance premiums.  If the attorney takes actions 
inconsistent with the interests of her principal that amount to 
malpractice, the principal will have a relatively certain pool of funds 
available for compensation. 
Bonding can serve as a substitute for monitoring costs, and vice 
versa.  A certain bonding expenditure may decrease the marginal 
expected utility of monitoring expenditures.  Moreover, inability to 
bond might signal a need to invest additional resources in 
monitoring.  For example, a testator might reject an estate planning 
attorney who is uninsurable since the bonding expenditure 
associated with the malpractice premium is a particularly worthwhile 
investment in protecting against potentially catastrophic losses 
associated with negligent estate planning.  But, perhaps more 
importantly, the uninsurability of the attorney signals a troubling 
message from insurance companies, which are parties that specialize 
in monitoring and spreading this type of risk.  The goal of the law in 
this respect should be to create incentives that encourage an optimal 
mix of bonding and monitoring costs.128 
The final class of agency costs is the principal’s lost welfare caused 
by the divergence in her interests from those of her agent.129  If 
because of circumstances such as technology, geography, or even 
personalities involved, an agent cannot be perfectly monitored or 
bonded, then we should expect that the interests of the principal and 
the agent will not be coextensive.  This remaining pocket of diverging 
interests is generally called the “residual loss” associated with 
agency.130  A client might monitor her attorney by calling regularly to 
ask about the status of a case.  The parties might make bonding 
expenditures by taking a portion of hers and other clients’ fees and 
allocating them for malpractice insurance.  But, she can only call so 
often before the attorney will no longer pay attention to her 
demands—creating a diminishing marginal return from time 
invested in this form of monitoring.  And, malpractice insurance 
policies cannot be continually renegotiated to cover every possible 
outcome harmful to the client.  The malpractice insurance might 
                                                          
 128. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089, 1093-94, 1149-50 (1981) (exploring legal incentives on bonding and 
monitoring of in termination of relational contracts). 
 129. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308. 
 130. Id. 
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cover catastrophic negligence, but it will not compensate the client 
for an attorney whose mind wanders while preparing a brief, leading 
to less than hoped for actual legal work product per billed hour.  
Despite the client’s best monitoring and bonding expenditures, the 
attorney who enjoys daydreaming whilst on the clock retains her 
incentive to work more slowly.  The client cannot easily discover the 
less than fully effective service allowing the attorney to capture a 
windfall when compared to the parties’ contract.  This windfall—the 
residual loss—is an agency cost the client must consider in comparing 
the benefit of an agent to its opportunity cost. 
It is at least theoretically possible that a principal could create a fee 
structure to proportionally compensate the agent for the value of 
each action taken.  But, to achieve this fee-to-act compensation 
structure, the value of each action taken by the agent would need to 
be “completely known” to the principal.131  In the real world, 
obtaining this information and negotiating the contractual terms of 
this contract is highly unlikely—particularly given that at some point 
marginal investment in monitoring will be offset by decreases in the 
agent’s productivity.  Thus, the distraction from a client calling her 
attorney once an hour to make sure she is on task might take up 
more of the attorney’s time than the daydreaming about which the 
client is concerned.  Rational principals will expend effort on 
monitoring and bonding until their marginal price of doing so is less 
than the expected benefit.  High monitoring and bonding costs may 
explain why so many agency relationships lack fee-to-act payment 
structures.  A six percent commission has been nearly universal for 
real estate agents.132  And, legal clients rarely give their counsel 
bonuses for highly productive billable hours.  In the real world, 
residual loss is often the dominant agency cost. 
In policing agency relationships, the legal system is not only 
concerned about aligning the incentives of principals and agents.  
Perhaps even more prominent are the policies addressing third 
parties affected by a principal’s agent.  It is true that agency law 
affords damages to a principal from an agent who by illegally shirking 
his duties has harmed the principal.  Yet, an old and oft-disputed 
stew-pot of litigation focuses on the extent to which principals can be 
                                                          
 131. Ross, supra note 11, at 138. 
 132. Posner, supra note 11, at 229; see Christopher Curran & Joel Schrag, Does it 
Matter Whom an Agent Serves?  Recent Changes in Real Estate Agency Law, 43 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 271 (2000) (observing that in 1993 the mean commission for houses sold was 
slightly over six percent). 
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held liable for the behavior of their agents that is harmful to others.133  
This harmful behavior may be unintentional—a result of accidental 
behavior just as likely to occur had the principal acted without an 
agent.  But, the harmful behavior might also have a causal link to the 
agency relationship itself.  Sometimes agency relationships facilitate 
harmful and inefficient behavior. 
Returning to our example of a client and her lawyer, suppose that 
the client for nefarious purposes hopes to intentionally inflict some 
harm on a third party.  She might physically assault her victim, but 
doing so would invite punishment from the state.  She might say 
hateful things to the victim, but unlike sticks and stones, words may 
not achieve the desired result.  An attorney, however, might be 
capable of using words in a special way to enlist the state in harming 
the victim.  Thus, the client might turn to an agent—a seasoned and 
cynical litigator with experience in using the machinery of law to 
impose costs on others—to maliciously sue her victim for no good 
reason.  Rational, self-interested parties to the agency relationship 
could both benefit:  the client gets satisfaction and the attorney gets 
paid.134  The law however, considers the interests of the third party 
and will impose a penalty on both the lawyer and the client for 
misusing its process.135  For us, the important point is that agency 
relationships—when left unchecked—can be used to capture an 
agent’s comparative advantage in both socially beneficial and socially 
destructive behavior.  With the behavior of agents, as with all human 
behavior, the law must create a regime of rules and procedure to sort 
out acceptable from unacceptable acts.  Agency cost theory does not 
alter this imperative.  We should expect Pareto dominated outcomes 
and great injustice, where agents specialize in illegitimate, yet 
profitable, acts that principals cannot themselves perform—or at least 
cannot perform without getting caught. 
                                                          
 133. See, e.g., Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1929) 
(holding a principal liable for an agent’s tortious acts committed within the course 
and scope of the agent’s employment). 
 134. It is not much of an objection to say that the client’s preference to harm 
another is irrational.  Economics has traditionally had little to say about the tastes of 
economic actors.  PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 81 (16th 
ed. 1998).  Economic theory in general, and agency theory in particular, does not 
have insight into why individuals and firms prefer the things they do.  Rather 
economic analysis helps us understand what individuals and firms will be willing to 
pay to realize their preferences given the forces of supply and demand.  Id.  In this 
view the client would not be irrational for wanting to inflict harm on another.  
Rather she would be irrational for paying more to inflict it than she had to. 
 135. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing the court to impose sanctions for 
presenting a pleading when it is for an improper purpose, when it is not warranted 
by existing law, when the pleading is not supported by evidence, or when denials of 
factual contentions are not warranted on the evidence). 
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III. BANK AGENTS AND PREEMPTION IN AN ERA OF PREDATORY 
LENDING:  AGENCY COSTS AND THE INCENTIVE TO FOREGO PREDATORY 
BEHAVIOR 
Although an agent and its principal both expect that their 
respective utility will exceed their costs, they do not necessarily share 
the same incentive structure vis-à-vis the third parties and the 
government.  Thus, in the case of consumer lending, it could be that 
a depository institution itself will have a greater incentive to avoid 
predatory behavior than will an agent of that institution.  In this Part, 
I argue that both consumer financial services law and the capital 
structure of that industry suggest at least three compelling reasons 
why bank agents are likely to be less averse to predatory lending then 
the banks they represent. 
First, agents of depository institutions are likely to be relatively less 
concerned about damage to their reputation from allegations of 
predatory lending.  Unlike their agents, banks have significant sunk 
costs invested in public perception of their business.  Much of a 
bank’s customer base is the result of its image and brand identity in 
its target market.136  To this end, banks spend significant resources in 
advertising and community relations.  Banks tend to have high 
profile roles in their communities.  On this point, Landes and Posner 
persuasively explained that consumers purchase something of 
significant value when contracting with brand name firms.137  The 
argument is that consumers recognize that higher profile firms have 
unrecoverable sunk costs, and thus are willing to pay a premium for 
the greater assurances associated with a brand name.138  When 
purchasing complex financial services where the consumer does not 
understand the terms of an agreement, there is no substitute for 
trust.  Even in an era of deposit insurance, it also takes significant 
trust to leave one’s money with a bank. Indeed this is why banking 
regulators uniformly consider reputational threats to be an important 
component of safety and soundness, even where that threat may not 
pose a short term threat to deposit insurance funds.  After all, when a 
car dealership is accused of cheating consumers, people may or may 
not be surprised; but when a national bank is accused of cheating, it 
                                                          
 136. It is generally well settled that the willingness of a firm to engage in a 
particular type of behavior can vary significantly with the extent that behavior is 
observable.  See, e.g., Steven C. Hackett, Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of 
Reputations and Repeated Contact?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 360 (1994) (investigating the 
feasibility of sharing based relational contracts where behavior is unobservable). 
 137. William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective, 
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-69 (1987). 
 138. Id. 
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makes the evening news.  This is not to say agents of depository 
institutions will be completely indifferent to reputational harm, but 
rather that they are unlikely to care as much as the depository 
institution itself.  Accordingly, other things being equal, agents of 
depository institutions will be marginally more averse to the 
reputational risks associated with predatory lending. 
Second, agents of depository institutions are likely to have less 
assets exposed to liability than depository institutions themselves.  
The primary deterrent to predatory lending in the American legal 
system is the risk of compensating victims for damages they have 
sustained.  Indeed the threat of damages is the primary tool used to 
enforce most law in our system.  This is why the growing trend of 
judgment proof commercial enterprises, particularly higher risk 
enterprises, is such a troubling development.  Lynn Lopucki has 
exposed a variety of strategies firms use to avoid compensating 
judgment creditors.139  The shared theme of each of these strategies is 
separating the liability generating component of a business from the 
assets used to fund, and those obtained from, the activity.  Several 
commentators have pointed out that many predatory lenders depend 
on sheltering their assets from victims to remain viable.140  This, at 
least in part, helps explain the extraordinary number of bankruptcies 
amongst subprime home mortgage lending firms in the 1990s.141 
                                                          
 139. See Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-38 (1996) 
(describing secured debt strategies, ownership strategies, exemption strategies, and 
foreign haven strategies as methods that firms use to avoid compensating creditors). 
 140. See, e.g., Vern Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other Anachronisms in 
Consumer Credit, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (observing sellers could avoid consumer 
liability by assigning contracts to a bank or finance company); Kurt Eggert, Held Up 
in Due Course:  Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 640 (2002) (arguing that the holder in due course is no 
longer necessary in residential loans); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, 
Predatory Lending:  What Does Wall Street Have to Do With It?, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
715, 715-16 (2004), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.com/programs/ 
hpd/pdf/hpd_1503_Engel.pdf (advocating punitive damage assignee liability for 
predatory loan origination in the absence of federally mandated due diligence); Julia 
Patterson Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement 
Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1137-38 (1996) (advocating ban of promissory notes 
and power of sale foreclosure in home improvement loans to create lender 
incentives to police “fly-by-night” home improvement contractors); Cassandra Jones 
Havard, To Lend or Not to Lend:  What the CRA Ought to Say About Sub-Prime and 
Predatory Lending, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 16-18 (2005) (explaining that a holder in 
due course doctrine used to launder predatory lending claims and form securitized 
mortgages); Siddhartha Venkatesan, Note, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine 
in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2003) (advocating an affirmative cause of action 
against predatory loan assignees). 
 141. Engel & McCoy, supra note 140, at 603; Eric Berquist, Preparing for a Bad-Loan 
Boom, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 2000, at 1. 
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However, at least one major participant in the economy has not yet 
been able to judgment proof its operations—at least when 
undertaken within its own firm structure:  the depository institution.  
Unlike other firms and individuals, depository institutions face stiff 
public capital requirements associated with protecting deposit 
insurance funds.  Banks must be cautious when engaging in 
predatory behavior because if a victim succeeds in obtaining 
damages, unlike an increasing number of businesses, the bank must 
actually pay.  In contrast, agents of banks may be much more likely to 
declare bankruptcy in the face of significant predatory lending 
liability.  And, if the profits of that predatory lending have already 
been distributed to shareholders, management, and secured 
creditors, predatory lending victims will have no remedy.142  
Moreover, unlike banks that face significant entry and exit costs, 
independent contractors such as mortgage brokerages, car 
dealerships, and loan servicing companies face virtually no entry or 
exit costs, since they require only minimal overhead, equipment, and 
financial reserves.  It is far easier for these businesses to simply slip 
out of existence once the heat for predatory practices is turned up.  
Unlike depository institutions, independent contractor agents of 
depository institutions have a relatively greater incentive to evolve 
into predatory specialists with a low-asset, judgment proof, fly-by-night 
capital structure. 
Finally, despite the best intentions of banking regulators, it is 
inevitable that independent contractor agents of depository 
institutions will receive less scrutiny than depository institutions 
themselves.  This is because, unlike consumer agency administrators, 
attorneys general, and the plaintiffs’ bar, the primary mission of 
banking regulators is to preserve the safety and soundness of the 
depository institutions they oversee.  In a world of scarce resources, 
banking regulators will always be forced to make difficult choices 
about where and how they spend their supervisory efforts.  
Independent contractors of depository institutions will always rank 
low in priority with respect to threats posed to deposit insurance 
funds.  Moreover, many independent contractors may be more 
difficult to supervise than depository institutions.  For example, car 
dealerships which are often located in out-of-the-way places, may lack 
                                                          
 142. It should go without saying that the bankruptcy code’s ninety day preference 
period is small consolation to consumers on this point.  11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(a) 
(2000).  This window which allows bankruptcy trustees to avoid payments and 
security interests granted on the eve of bankruptcy.  But, ninety days is far too short a 
period of time to prevent judgment proofing when compared to the extremely long 
life cycles of a significant predatory lending class action or attorney general lawsuit. 
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the technology and record keeping to facilitate quick auditing, and—
at least in some parts of the country—may have business cultures 
resistant to oversight by the U.S. Treasury Department.  Moreover, 
because independent agents of depository institutions receive neither 
a charter nor permission to expand from banking regulators, 
regulators may be surprised to find how little leverage they have over 
these non-bank actors.  All together, we should expect that these 
factors will systematically impede the ability of banking regulators to 
keep a close eye on independent contractors.  Other things being 
equal, federal regulators’ relative deterrence against predatory 
behavior will be marginally less for independent contractor agents 
than the depository institutions those agents serve. 
The implications of agents’ lower incentive to avoid predation are 
further illuminated when one considers the possibility of vicarious 
liability.  If we assume that a bank or thrift cannot be held liable for 
the illegal predatory behavior of its agent, then a rational, profit-
maximizing bank would simply outsource predatory behavior 
whenever that behavior is profitable.  For consumers this is clearly the 
worse alternative of the two possible rules.143 
But even if the depository institution will be held liable for its 
agent’s predation, the residual loss cost of agency suggests that the 
agent will still retain a predatory incentive.  Take, as an example, an 
agency relationship between a car dealership and a national bank 
similar to that involved in the OCC’s determination to preempt state 
law with respect to agents of national banks.  Since the bank will be 
liable for its agent’s practices, we can expect it to use monitoring and 
bonding expenditures to reduce the risk that the agent will seek to 
maximize its profit through illegal behavior.  Liability should be a 
robust deterrent for the bank since it values its reputation, it has high 
exit and entry costs into the marketplace, and public asset 
requirements guarantee that the bank has significant resources to 
lose if exposed to the wrath of an indignant jury.  Still, the profits to 
be had from using a car dealer as a marketing and delivery vehicle for 
its loans could be too tempting to pass up.  We would expect that the 
bank would attempt to monitor the car dealership by regularly 
auditing the dealership’s books, by conducting due diligence on the 
dealership’s reputation and financial stability, and by retaining the 
right to make key decisions with respect to loan approval.  A risk-
                                                          
 143. In a related forthcoming piece, I argue that this is precisely what has 
happened in the market for private label subprime home mortgage backed securities 
market.  See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance: Securitization, 
Liability, and Home Mortgage Lending, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2007). 
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averse bank might even require that the dealership maintain a 
modest cash collateral account in escrow to compensate the bank for 
any liability it incurs from the agent. 
Still, the car dealership gets paid only by closing loans, giving it an 
incentive to close as many loans as possible—even ones where the 
borrower may not actually qualify for a loan, or where the borrower 
may not actually agree to the loan being offered.  The dealer has an 
incentive to overestimate the credit worthiness of the borrower by 
padding the borrower’s reported income.  Similarly, the dealer has 
an incentive to obtain the borrower’s signature by hiding or 
misrepresenting the true cost of the loan.  Such risks are far from 
theoretical.  Rather they make up the core of the thousands of 
consumer protection cases involving car dealerships, mortgage 
brokers, and consumers. 
The incentive structure of the dealer is even further misaligned 
where the dealer is compensated with a yield spread premium, as it 
was in the National City Bank petition acted upon by the OCC.  In 
such contracts, the bank obtains a monitoring advantage of knowing 
that the dealer will try to get the greatest return possible on the 
bank’s assets.  But, this return may or may not be a legal return.  In a 
democratic society, banks and car dealers must not discriminate in 
the prices they charge based on impermissible protected classes.  
Doing otherwise is a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(as well as the Fair Housing Act in the case of home mortgages).144 
But even absent discrimination, yield spread premiums are an 
invitation to loan brokers to commit fraud and to commit deceptive 
practices,145 as well as violate the Truth-in-Lending Act,146 since 
consumers must somehow be enticed into agreeing to a contract with 
a value lower than the consumer’s opportunity cost.  By definition, 
rational consumers will not agree to pay higher interest rates than 
they qualify for from the very lender with whom they contracted.  
Yield spread premium compensation is contingent upon an irrational 
contract.  Where a broker or dealer specializes in obtaining 
consumer signatures on contracts that are against the consumers’ 
own best interests, we should expect fraud, deception, and obscured 
disclosure. 
                                                          
 144. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000). 
 145. TAMING THE SHARKS, supra note 22, at 142-43. 
 146. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000); see Westbank v. Maurer, 276 
Ill. App. 3d 553, 559 (1995) (“The purpose of the [Truth in Lending] Act is to 
promote the informed use of credit by requiring lenders to make meaningful 
disclosure of the debtor’s rights and obligations in a form easily understood by the 
debtor.”). 
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This analysis exposes a troubling paradox in the recent public 
policy advocacy of depository institutions and federal banking 
regulators.  With one hand, banks and their regulators are 
attempting to distance themselves from their proxies.  Frequently in 
predatory lending cases involving a lender and an independent 
contractor of that institution, consumers will propose joint liability 
theories seeking to hold the depository institution liable for the 
behavior of its agent.  Without variation, in these cases, the lenders 
characterize their agents as autonomous and independent so that the 
wrongful actions of the one cannot be attributed to the other.147  
Therefore, when a bank takes a home mortgage on assignment from 
a table-funded mortgage broker, it is likely to claim that it lacked 
notice of any fraud by the broker.  Thus, the bank preserves its status 
as a holder in due course.148  Or, when a bank makes an automobile 
loan to a consumer through a car dealer agent, the bank will refuse 
to accept responsibility for the fraud, deception, and obscured 
disclosure of the dealership.149 
Yet, on the other hand, depository institutions and federal banking 
regulators are attempting to characterize their proxies as virtually 
indistinguishable from themselves.  In the debate over preemption of 
state law with respect to agents, banking regulators have 
characterized the legal boundaries between a depository institution 
and its non-bank agent as merely a choice about capital structure with 
little or no bearing on the commercial reality of the transactions in 
which the agent will engage.150  Thus, in its opinion on preemption of 
state law with respect to independent contractors of thrifts, the OTS 
explained: 
                                                          
 147. See, e.g., Mason v. Fieldstone Mortgage Co., No. 00 C 0228, 2000 WL 1643589, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that financial institutions were not defendant’s agents, 
and so defendant was not liable for their actions under aider-abetter liability); 
Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(finding a sufficient pleading by plaintiff of civil co-conspirator liability); George v. 
Capital S. Mortgage Invs., Inc., 961 P.2d 32, 35-39, 44-45 (Kan. 1998) (inferring joint 
venturer liability, from the evidence); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 
868-69 (Ohio 1998) (allowing liability under a theory of civil co-conspirator liability); 
Pennsylvania v. Parisi, 873 A.2d 3, 10-11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (rejecting 
defendants’ denial of aider-abetter liability). 
 148. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:  The Law 
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1301 (2001) (“[A] secondary-
market purchaser can defeat ‘personal’ defenses if it meets the following 
requirements for a holder in due course:  (1) the purchaser is the holder, (2) of a 
negotiable note, (3) who took the note for value, (4) in good faith, and (5) without 
notice of the defenses.”). 
 149. Jackson v. S. Holland Dodge, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1146, 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 150. OTS, P-2004-7, supra note 67, at 24-25. 
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[F]ederal savings associations have the freedom to make 
business decisions about the manner in which they will 
conduct their operations. This includes decisions as to 
how to market and offer the association’s products and 
services, and how to best facilitate customer access to, 
and applications for, such products and services. An 
association’s decision as to how to conduct its operations 
and market its products and services should not result in 
the association being subject to a hodgepodge of state 
requirements. An association should not be hamstrung 
in the exercise of its authorized powers merely because it 
chooses to market its products and services using agents 
whose activities the association closely monitors and 
controls.151 
The use of the word “merely” is rather befuddling, given that the 
agency had just used the federal thrift statutes to preempt state law 
for people that are not thrifts.  More importantly, the profoundly 
different predatory incentives of a thrift, in comparison to its 
independent contractor, hint at a concrete economic reason why 
preemption should not extend beyond the federally chartered 
depository institution itself. 
Certainly the extent to which a depository institution will have 
notice of and control over the predatory behavior of an independent 
agent will depend on the facts of each circumstance.  But then, is this 
not an argument against preempting state law with respect to 
independent agents?  State governments have the ability to 
experiment with different approaches in designing rules to ferret out 
which types of contracts and which types of agents are more likely to 
engage in predatory behavior than their depository masters.152  State 
governments have the geographic flexibility to more accurately 
respond to the wide variations in the severity of credit fraud in 
different states.  State governments are more likely to have a vested 
local political interest in responding to the needs of consumers 
affected by predatory lending.  State governments are more likely to 
have an infrastructure in place that is capable of dealing with car 
dealers, mortgage brokers, loan services, and other agents than 
federal banking regulators, which have limited legislative missions, 
                                                          
 151. Id. at 25-26. 
 152. See Azmy, supra note 26, at 391-92 (observing that federalism promotes a 
decentralized decision-making structure, which allows state governments 
opportunities for innovation and experimentation with social and economic 
policies).  Azmy further notes that predatory lending regulations, in particular, 
should not be implemented at a national level until they are tested on a smaller scale 
by “laboratory” states.  Id. at 393-94. 
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limited funding, and limited personnel.  Returning to the OCC’s 
agent preemption determination, are the two small OCC offices in 
Detroit and Iron Mountain really prepared to police the consumer 
credit practices of Michigan’s 1,930 licensed motor vehicle 
installment sellers153—including those with confidence inducing 
names like “The Used Car Factory,”154 “ACE Used Cars of 
Muskegon,”155 and “Ultimate Value Auto Sales?”156 
CONCLUSION 
By attempting to extend preemption to the agents of depository 
institutions, banking regulators have removed from state regulation 
complex, unpredictable, and potentially harmful relationships.  The 
shifting incentives of agents have confounded scholars, regulators, 
and judges—not to mention economists—in a tremendous cross-
section of legal relationships.  Even with the most carefully devised 
monitoring and bonding expenditures, independent agents cannot 
be expected to always act in the interests of the depository institutions 
they represent.  It is less likely that an independent agent’s interests, 
even when constrained by monitoring and bonding, will happen to 
coincide with the welfare of the American people. 
At a minimum, the agency costs associated with depository 
institution agents suggest that if we as a country go forward with 
preemption for these actors, it is absolutely essential that the fabric of 
state, legal, and administrative protections be replicated on a federal 
level.  Currently, there is no credible federal legal or regulatory 
strategy that can deter the agents of federal depository institutions, at 
least with respect to the problems posed by predatory lending.  There 
                                                          
 153. The Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau license data base lists 1,930 
licensed motor vehicle installment sellers in Michigan.  Michigan Dep’t of Labor and 
Econ. Growth, OFIS Search Criteria for Consumer Finance Licensees, 
http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/fis/ind_srch/cons_fin/ofis_consumer_finance_criteria.
asp?industry=InS (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).  The OCC is divided into four districts.  
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, http://www.occ. 
treas.gov/district.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).  Michigan is in the central region 
which is headquartered in Chicago.  Id.  The Chicago headquarters regulates 
Indiana, eastern and northwestern Iowa, northern Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
eastern Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, southwestern Virginia, 
southwestern West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 154. Michigan Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License No. IS-19592, http:// 
www.dleg.state.mi.us/fis/ind_srch/cons_fin/consumer_finance_companies_detail.as
p?nbr=19592&type=IS (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
 155. Michigan Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License No. IS-0010722,  http:// 
www.dleg.state.mi.us/fis/ind_srch/cons_fin/consumer_finance_companies_detail.as
p?nbr=0010722&type=IS (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
 156. Michigan Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License No. IS-20644, http:// 
www.dleg.state.mi.us/fis/ind_srch/cons_fin/consumer_finance_companies_detail.as
p?nbr=20644&type=IS (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
PETERSON.OFFTOPRINTE 1/30/2007  12:43:42 PM 
550 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:3 
is no federal usury law to check the outrageous prices of payday loan 
banking agents.157  There is no serious federal predatory mortgage 
lending law.158  There is no private cause of action for the Federal 
Trade Commission Act to enforce the FTC’s regulations on unfair 
and deceptive trade practices.159  For their part, federal banking 
regulators have not flinched, even as credit card interest rates have 
crept closer and closer to the federal per se extortionate loan 
sharking trigger of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.160  Even well-
settled and long established federal consumer protection statutes, 
such as the Truth-in-Lending Act, are in a state of shameful 
disrepair.161 And finally, there are simply far too few federal regulators 
to monitor the agents of depository institutions. 
Furthermore, policy makers must accept the reality that if the legal 
system grants agents of federal depository institutions immunity from 
state laws, it will create a potentially irresistible incentive for states to 
follow suit.  If federal depository institutions can outsource their 
special legal status along with their operations, then state depository 
institutions, and the regulators that derive their revenue and power 
from them, will inevitably clamor for the same treatment.  The floor 
must not be lowered for agents of federal depository institutions, lest 
the floor be lowered for agents of all depository institutions. 
                                                          
 157. See National Consumer Law Center, Comments on Community Reinvestment 
Act Regulations (Apr. 6, 2003), http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/test_and_ 
comm/040604MS.shtml (recommending that the Federal Reserve Board exercise its 
authority to visit the “question of the legality, fairness, and morality of payday 
lending” practices). 
 158. See Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending, supra note 4, at 59 (discussing 
the narrow scope and substantive limitations of HOEPA). 
 159. Section 45(m) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides only for 
governmental commencement of civil actions to enforce the Act in prevention of 
unfair or deceptive acts and practices.  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
41-58 (2000).  
 160. See 18 U.S.C. § 892(b) (2000) (establishing presumption of extortion for 
loans with interest rates in excess of forty-five percent); Kathleen Day & Caroline E. 
Mayer, Credit Card Penalties, Fees Bury Debtors; Senate Nears Action on Bankruptcy Curbs, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1 (reporting that some credit card penalty interest 
rates are as high as forty percent). 
 161. The Truth-in-Lending Act’s $25,000 scope limitation is now lower than the 
purchase price of a middle class family sedan.  15 U.S.C. § 1603(3).  Inflation since 
the Congress adopted the Truth-in-Lending Act has rendered the statutory damage 
awards for violations of the Act comically irrelevant.  The maximum statutory 
damage award for an ordinary Truth-in-Lending violation is $1,000, which is now the 
equivalent of approximately $193.00 in 1968 dollars.  Robert C. Sahr, Consumer 
Price Index (“CPI”) Conversion Factors to Convert to 2005 Dollars, http:// 
oregonstate.edu/Dept/pol_sci/fac/sahr/cv2005_x.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).  
Moreover, by the Federal Reserve Board’s own admission, only seventy-eight percent 
of national banks actually complied with the Truth-in-Lending Act in 2003.  BOARD 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 91ST ANNUAL REPORT 71 (2004), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual04/ar04.pdf. 
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The regulatory apparatus of the United States has not yet 
demonstrated the capability to successfully regulate the abusive and 
predatory practices of depository institutions themselves.  It is 
nonsensical to suggest, with hardly a quiet breath of authorization 
from the Congress, that federal banking regulators can be trusted to 
also police actors lending through tenuous, shifting, and volatile 
agency relationships.  Indeed, it leads one to fear that federal 
regulators have only token intentions to police these relationships at 
all.  And therein lies a final ironic twist:  perhaps the more 
fundamental principal-agent monitoring failure lies in the inability of 
the American people to successfully monitor their agents charged 
with overseeing the nation’s banking industry. 
 
 
